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Karin Kneissl1 
This text is the abbreviated version of a detailed study submitted to the Beirut office of the 
German Foundation Friedrich Ebert (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) in December 2009. The 
analysis is based on a visit to South-Lebanon in mid-October 2009, a series of interviews, 
and the author's earlier research in the region, wishes to highlight the role of UNIFIL II in 
maintaining stability in Lebanon. After the war of 34 days between the Shiite Lebanese 
party cum militia Hizbullah and Israel in summer 2006 on Lebanese territory, the 
international community launched a major effort to stabilize the situation in the area. 
UNIFIL II was created on the basis on UN-Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). The 
resolution authorized 15.000 troops, supported by international and local staff. The current 
strength comprises 12,341 military personnel, supported by some 335 international civilian 
and 664 local civilian staff. UNIFIL is also supported by around 50 UNTSO military 
observers of the Observer Group Lebanon. Among the major objectives of UNIFIL rank its 
assistance to the Lebanese authorities in re-establishing their sovereignty. 
The United Nations being an inter-governmental organization dependent on the will of 
its 192 member states can facilitate this endeavour, but a large part of responsibility lies 
with the Lebanese government. The key-notion of "ownership" means that certain tasks 
currently in the hands of the UN-troops will have to be gradually transferred to the 
Lebanese government and its security forces. The build-up of the Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF), able to act as a real force of deterrence and present on the entire territory, is 
essential. 
In the past years, the LAF has certainly turned into an institution beyond confessional 
strife which the Lebanese trust. That was certainly true in the events of May 2007 when the 
LAF had to conduct a difficult operation against Islamists in a Palestinian refugee camp in 
Tripoli. The army paid a high toll. Both military decision-takers and the population would 
like to see the LAF much trained and equipped. UNIFIL assists the LAF in that sense. The 
emergence of a Lebanese marine force is tightly linked to the activities of the Maritime 
Task Force (MTF), which the German contingent assures. Various governments, in 
particular the US and within the EU, should allow transfer of high-tech weaponry to 
Lebanon. Israel and Hizbullah seem to converge in their efforts to keep the LAF weak, 
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since both reject such supply. In the absence of a well respected and solid LAF, they can 
continue to assert their spheres of influence, as is the case with Hizbullah, or systematically 
violate Lebanese sovereignty as Israel does. The issue of Hizbullah's paramilitary 
structures causes splits in the Lebanese government of national unity of November 2009. 
The cabinet's declaration states the right of "Lebanon, its government, its people, its army 
and its resistance" to liberate all Lebanese territory. Hizbullah is commonly referred to as 
the resistance in Lebanon. Hizbullah argues its arms are necessary to protect the country 
against any future aggression by Israel. 
The unpredictable strategy of Israel - such as its possible desire to apply the lessons 
drawn from the war in summer 2006 in a new military campaign - contributes dangerously 
to the volatility in Lebanon. The psychological war by Israel on the role of the Shiite party 
cum militia Hizbullah is already in full swing. Both sides accuse each other of preparing a 
new round of clashes. The option of another proxy-war between Iran and Saudi Arabia on 
Lebanese soil constitutes another risk. The war of 34 days of summer 2006 was called such 
a proxy-war by many analysts. The financial crisis in the Gulf and the war in Yemen could 
fuel such a scenario; both are partly linked to the antagonism between Tehran and Riyadh. 
The generous support of the international community should not be taken for granted. 
Many more conflicts are looming in and beyond the region. Afghanistan is the big headache 
for many contributing governments for they have to find the fresh troops requested by 
NATO. Financial constraints for the main contributors due to the global economic crisis 
might reduce the international commitment to the current operation in Lebanon. However, 
the costs for a peace-keeping are much lower than those for humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction. The main contributors to UNIFIL II are important UN and NATO members, 
such as France, Italy and Germany. China, another permanent member of the UN-SC, is 
present with 1.000 troops. This spectre of troops is part of a larger security guarantee for 
Lebanon. Their participation should, therefore, remain essential. 
The long and volatile chronology of UNIFIL 
Lebanon started to host the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in March 1978 
subsequent to an Israeli invasion.2 These 2000 UNIFIL troops dispatched - for an initially 
limited, but never defined time-period - into the frontier space between Lebanon, Syria and 
Israel could not prevent wars and hostilities which followed, notably because of incursions 
of PLO-fighters into Israel and Israeli acts of retaliation. But UNIFIL used its best efforts to 
limit the conflict, contribute to stability in the region and protect the population of the area 
from the worst effects of violence. The mission was regularly extended for a six-month 
period. 
The then-UNIFIL mandate was large and vague. A major part of it, the departure of 
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) was finally realized in May 2000. Israel withdrew from 
occupied South-Lebanon in accordance with UN-SC resolution 425 (1978). The so-called 
2 Operation Litani in spring 1978 and Peace for Galilee in summer 1982 were two large scale 
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security belt in South Lebanon established by the Israeli occupation had become a zone of 
insecurity for Israeli soldiers because of the guerilla war the Lebanese-Shiite party and 
militia Hizbullah conducted against the IDF. Given the armed liberation of South Lebanon 
Hizbullah gained in military and political power both inside Lebanon and beyond. The 
frontier-region was now effectively controlled by Hizbullah while the state's authorities 
could not exercise jurisdiction in the South. 
In summer 2006 a completely new rapport des forces between Hizbullah and Israel 
determined a major armed conflict in the region. That asymmetrical war was not to be won 
by Israel. Its airborne bombing and destruction of the infrastructure led to a Pyrrhus victory 
of Hizbullah. Their guerrilla war tactics had imposed a defeat on the conventional Israeli 
army. But the civilian population of Lebanon paid the main toll.3 
The UN-Security Council (UN-SC) passed resolution 1701 on 11th August, 2006 
thereby established a new cease-fire and the mandate for an enlarged PKO. UNIFIL II 
emerged with 15.000 troops from 28 contributing states. As of mid-September the first 
contingents had arrived, one of the swiftest transfer of troops for a PKO ever completed. 
The earlier UNIFIL mandate and the new one are intertwined. Additional resolutions of the 
UN-SC do complement them. Now into their fourth year, the UN-forces do, inter alia, assist 
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in re-establishing the state's control in the frontier-
region, their achievements are visible. Checkpoints once controlled by Hizbullah have been 
dismantled; Lebanese soldiers are stationed at the posts. 
Reconstruction results are admirable. Mine-clearance and amazing efforts by the local 
population in agriculture and manufacturing have improved the quality of life in the glacis 
of South-Lebanon, which over decades served as a theatre for military adventures of all 
sorts. The role of the state has been contested by many actors: stretching from the "PLO 
state within the state" of the 1970s, to the South-Lebanese Army, a Christian militia 
organized by Israel, to the current issue of Hizbullah's prerogatives as national resistance 
movement. One of the crucial pending problems remains of course the situation of and 
within the large Palestinian refugee camps, such as Ayn Al Helwe. Jihadist movements, 
sponsored by extremist Sunni sources, caused a war against the Lebanese army in a 
Palestinian refugee camp in the north in May 2007. Similar risks exist in the south, though 
it seems that the Shiite Hizbullah establishes a military and political counter-weight to such 
radical Sunni influence.4 
A small incident might trigger a larger conflict at any time. A casus belli can always be 
found if one of the parties to the conflict is seeking a new outbreak of hostilities. Can the 
UN-troops pre-empt that? Which actors do have leverage on the main parties to the 
conflict? How can the potential risk of war by accident be reduced? Though diplomats and 
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military observers try to display optimism, tension is tangible. Observers in Beirut fear an 
Israeli attack in spring 2010, in order to take revenge for the defeat of 2006. Rockets 
launched from Lebanon continue to hit Israel on an irregular level. These attacks, according 
to UN-sources and confirmed by the Israeli intelligence, mostly stem from radical 
Palestinian groups, while Hizbullah respects the cease-fire of 11 August 2006. Israel 
conscious of that compliance, reacts by rather limited artillery fire without targeting 
Hizbullah posts. For its part, Israel continues to systematically violate Lebanese air-space. 
It is accused of espionage in South-Lebanon, as recent discoveries of respective devices in 
Sidon have illustrated. The issue of arms' smuggling into Lebanon dominates the Israeli list 
of complaints about violations of UN-SC resolution 1701. Again, a casus belli can be easily 
established in particular when it comes to the issue of arms' cargo.5 
Interpretation of the UNIFIL mandate 
The ultimate power of interpretation lies with the UN-Security Council which governs the 
terms of operation of the mandate. The rules of engagement serve as reference. 
Furthermore, the troop contributing states do their interpretation on pertinent issues. When 
questions arise inside the UNIFIL offices in Lebanon, the political officers will turn to the 
Legal Office of the UN-Secretariat in New York and require advice. Such was the case, for 
instance, with regard to the term "hostile activity" as coined in UN-SC resolution 1701 
(2006). Paragraph 12 states that the UN-SC "(...) authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary 
action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure 
that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind (...)". Controversy 
arose whether "hostile acts" or also "hostile intent" were meant. Apparently, the mandate 
could have become tighter if the debate had continued for much longer. Israel wanted a list 
of titles and categories defining all sorts of hostile acts, Lebanon had a different, but not 
less detailed approach. A pragmatic view prevailed, all parties concerned decided to do the 
interpretation on a case by case approach.6 The final determination of a "hostile act" 
remains with UNIFIL. The tripartite meetings of UNIFIL-Israel-LAF ease the tension, but 
mutual confidence remains low. It should be stressed, that Hizbullah is not a party to the 
UN-SC resolution 1701 (2006), but the LAF does pass on information that UNIFIL wishes 
to reach Hizbullah. 
On certain occasions, common sense of the people can definitely contribute to the 
diffusion of tension. In August 2009, several cows moved from the other side of the Israeli 
technical fence into UNIFIL controlled area close to Kfar Chouba in Lebanon. It may be 
assumed that the cows did not open the gates by themselves, but received a helping hand 
from Israeli farmers. The destination of the cows was a water-hole used by Lebanese 
shepherds for their sheep. Angered by that intrusion the Lebanese were looking for an 
5 The case of the Francorp entered by the Israeli marine on 3 Nov. has been received with doubts. See 
the Swiss daily NZZ, 26 Nov. 2009. Apparently the sealed boxes of Iranian origin still carried the 
inscription "Ministry of Sepah", though it has been renamed into Ministry of Defence 15 years ago 
according to the démenti advanced by Tehran. 
6 Background conversation with members of UNIFIL in Tyr in mid-October 2009. 
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adequate reply. They dispatched their dogs guarding the sheep towards the cows and chased 
them back to Israel. The Indian battalion of UNIFIL then enlarged its post in order to 
supervise that very waterhole. Having visited the area and learnt about that incident which 
could have ultimately provoked a major clash between "Zionist cows and terrorist sheep" 
around the same water hole, it becomes clear how fragile the situation is and that often time 
might not suffice to start a legal interpretation. The clever reaction of the farmers and the 
efficiency of the shepherd dogs helped to handle an otherwise delicate incident.7 
All acts of Israeli violation of the Lebanese airspace might also be considered as some 
sort of interpretation of the UNIFIL mandate, namely disregard for the role of the LAF in 
asserting Lebanese sovereignty. Once the LAF react efficiently by anti-aircraft fire, the 
rules of interpretation might be re-established. All implementation of the UNIFIL mandate 
has to be read not only via the legal textbook, the well known rules of teleological 
interpretation, namely pursuing the larger purpose of the mission. It is essential to bear in 
mind the reality on the ground, or better the many realities and their perceptions. UNIFIL 
acts as diligent witness via its widespread presence in the frontier area. Its highly precious 
work of keeping detailed record of every single incident is essential. This data and the 
debates at the tripartite meetings of UNIFIL, the LAF and the IDF are indispensible factors 
for assessment. 
"Il n'y a que le provisoire qui dure - only the provisory persists", this quote attributed to 
the French statesman Charles de Gaulle, does well illustrate the situation of UNIFIL. 
Against all odds the mission did start well in September 2006 and has gone into its fourth 
year without major setbacks. On the contrary, the sovereignty of Lebanon has been 
gradually restored. The withdrawal of the Syrian forces being one important factor. Many 
skeptical voices expected it to run into a similarly difficult situation as UNPROFOR (UN 
Protection Force) did between 1993 and 1995 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The wide scope of 
the mandate of UNIFIL has evolved successfully. These accomplishments are due to: 
1) The interest of all parties, i.e. the Governments of Lebanon and Israel as well as 
the Lebanese militia and political party Hizbullah, to observe UN-SC resolution 
1701 (2006). 
2) The expertise of the entire staff, civilian and military, involved. 
3) The pragmatic interpretation of the pertinent UN-SC resolutions. 
4) The determination by the international community, in particular, the troop-
contributing States, which encompass important EU-Member States and 
Permanent Members of the UN-SC, to implement UN-SC res. 1701 (2006). 
Still the period of implementation is "ad interim". The stability of Lebanon is closely 
linked to the overall regional situation. The destiny of the Palestinian refugee population in 
Lebanon remains in limbo and creates a series of uncertainties for Lebanon, notably the 
issue of their future citizenship and permanent residence. Israel would have to declare her 
state-territory and thereby finalize the borders with Lebanon and Syria. The territorial status 
of the Sheba'a farms has to be solved in function of the delimitation of the borders. This 
protracted conflict with its long list of wars, refugee waves and cease-fires is first of all a 
7 Background conversation with EU military attachés in mid-October 2009. 
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conflict about territory. This can only be solved via a territorial solution which will have to 
be complemented by security guarantees. 
The remark by Prince Clemens Metternich on Lebanon dating from 1830 is still valid: 
"Le Liban - ce petit pays si important." (Lebanon - such a small country and so important) 
The perception of being important, however, should not be overstrained. The cooperation 
between UNIFIL and the Lebanese authorities should enable the transformation of today's 
division of labour partly assured by UNIFIL. The Lebanese government will have to 
assume the comprehensive task of assuring the territorial integrity of the state and build up 
a credible army. 
